Recently, William Poole and others have argued that the yields on 3-month Treasury bill futures contracts can be expected to be less than the corresponding implied forward rates, that these futures rates are unbiased market estimates of future Treasury bill spot rates, and that it is not necessary to allow for risk premia when using yields on futures contracts to measure market expectations of future interest rates.' If these arguments are correct, a great deal of empirical work in economics that includes variables on interest rate expectations will be greatly simplified. In addition, such conclusions would allow policymakers to easily assess the differences between their own interest rate forecasts and the market's expectations of the future course of interest rates. As Poole notes, policymakers face difficult problems when market interest rate forecasts differ from the policymakers' forecasts, since they then must decide whether their own estimates of economic activity are incorrect or whether the market is misinterpreting the policymakers' plans. 4
Unfortunately, the results reported in this paper do not support these conclusions about the relationship between futures rates and forward rates for futures contracts, except for the ones closest to delivery, which were the ones investigated by Poole. Extrapolation of Poole's conclusions to other futures contracts is therefore unwarranted, and other explanations for the relationship between forward and futures rates must be explored. One factor considered here is the possibility of default risk affecting yields on futures contracts.
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:~>:~)Ẽ xpectations of future interest rates play an important role in many areas of economics; topics in both micro-and macroeconomics deal with interest rate expectations. Since such expectational variables generally are not observable, researchers have only been able to proxy them by nsing various substitutes, such as by constructing expeetational variables on the basis of the past history of each variable. This approach is problematical in that when such expectational proxies are used in empirical research, a joint test is made: both the hypothesis and the assumed expectations-formnation mechanism are tested.
One alternative to such joint tests is to survey a specific group (such as financial consultants) as to their expectations of interest rates for various future periods. Such a survey has been reported since 1969 in the Goldsmith and Nagan Bond and Money Market Letter. 5 However, such surveys are subject to problems that may limit their usefulness. One problem is basically statistical, but another deals with the timing of the survey. The Goldsmith-Nagan survey is quarterly, which makes its use for shorter periods very difficult.
An alternative approach that allows the use of daily data focuses upon changes in interest i-ate expectations rather than levels, and is based upon changes in the shape of the yield curve from one date to another. A yield curve relates the yields-to-maturity of a group of securities to their terms-to-maturity, for securities with similar characteristics other than maturity. In particular, all of the securities used in constructing a yield curve have similar default risk. For example, yield curves are usually drawn for Treasury securities, or for corporate Aaa bonds, as of a particular date. The yield curve indicates the structure of interest rates on a given date for securities with the same risk of default and different terms-to-maturity.
Changes in the shape of the yield curve from one date to another involve changes in implied forward rates, A forward rate is the yield on a loan or investment over some period beginning at a specified future time. Such a forward rate can be obtained by an appropriate combination of buying and selling bonds outstanding, For example, by selling a 1-year bond t Otber interest rate sun'eys have been collected by various researchers, hut are not regularly published, For example, see Edward j, Kane and Burton G, Malkiel, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Analysis of a Survey of Interest-Rate Expectations," The Review of Economics and Statistics (August 1967), pp. 343-55, and buying a 2-year bond, a 1-year investment is effectively made that will begin 1 year hence at a rate of interest established by the difference in the spot market yields for the 1-and 2-year bonds. The forward rate on this loan is defined by:
where ,F, is the forward rate on a 1-year loan to begin in 1 year, B 2 is the spot rate on 2-year bonds, and R, is the spot rate on 1-year bonds.
More generally. for a 1-period investment to begin n-i periods in the future the forward rate is:
where 5 ,F, is the forward rate on a 1-period loan to begin in n-i periods, B. is the spot rate on n-period bonds, and R, , is the spot rate on (n-i )-period bonds.
Thus, the yield curve at any given point in time implies a set of 1-period forward rates to prevail on forward (or future) transactions. Such forward rates have economic content, however, only if the implied transactions are possible in the market, and can be carried out by market traders. 6
In theories of the term structure of interest rates, the forward rates (,, 1 F,) are often decomposed into a 1-period expected rate (~E,) plus a premium (a liquidity premium associated with interest-rate risk or a term premium associated with investors' preferences for bonds with specific ranges of maturities). 7
For a set of 1-period forxvard rates on a given date, there is then a set of 1-period expected rates stretching out into the future. Under the assumption that the premia are stable over time, changes in the structure of interest rates (measured by changes in the yield curve) reflect changes in interest rate expectations. Thus, by examining the changes in the implied forward rates contained in the term structure, researchers can obtain an estimate of the changes in interest rate expectations, even though the level of expected interest rates is not readily estimable, However, such calculations are time consuming and costly -in terms of both data collection and computer time. One must obtain quotations on securities outstanding (e.g. Treasury issues), fill in missing data points by estimating a yield curve, then calculate forward rates. This is a difficult task if done monthly, and expensive to do weekly or daily. As a result, it is expensive to use yield curve data to assess the effect of new information about economic policies or of the state of the economy on expectations of future interest rates. Futures markets in 3-month Treasury bills allow us to observe directly the yields or prices on 3-month bills to be delivered at certain dates in the future. Thus, they are the market counterpart of the implied forward loans or investments which can be constructed from Treasury yield curve data. But instead of requiring large efforts at data collection, estimation, and calculation, these yields are readily available from daily quotations in The Wall Street Journal and other newspapers.
As new information about the economy or economic policy becomes available to market traders. this information is incorporated into the market prices and yields of Treasury bill futures contracts. To the extent that such new information changes market expectations of interest rates, it is reflected in changes in the Treasury bill futures rates. Yields on futures contracts could also be broken down into expectational and premium components, just as in the case of forward rates implicit in the yield curve-Again, the level of expected future interest rates rutty not be readily estimable, hut changes in market expectations of future interest rates can be observed from changes in yields on futures contracts, under the assumption that the premia are stable.°C Since implied forward rates calculated from the yield curve are, in theory, rates on forward loans or investments such as those actually made in the Treasury bill futures market, the question arises as to whether yields on 3-month Treasury bill futures contracts are equal to 3-month forward rates calculated from the Treasury yield curve. It would be convenient if the two sets of yields were equal, so that we would not have to be concerned with any separate informational content of either data set (especially since yields on Treasury bill futures are easier to obtain).
A test for the equality of the two yields, as of a quotation date, can be made by comparing yields on Treasury bill futures contracts with yields on implied forward contracts for the same periods. First, we choose a set of quotation dates. Then, we obtain the yields on Treasury bill futures contracts on those dates for each available delivery date. Next, we obtain quotations on L'S. Treasury securities outstanding on those same quotation dates. From these data we calculate implied 3-month forward rates that match the 3-month Treasury bill futures contracts. Finally, we calculate the difference (in absolute value) between the two sets of rates to determine whether they are significantly different from each other.
The selection of quotation dates for yields on Treasury bill futures contracts and yields on outstanding Treasury securities were obtained by random selections of thirty quotation dates from each of three periods of roughly equal length -eight to nine months,'°The first thirty quotation dates were taken from the period 'All t-stat, tic are a gniflcantly different from 'era at the 1 percent leseL from the Federal Beserye Bank of New Yo k s "Com posite Closing Quotations for L.S. Government Securities.' All yields were converted from a discount basis to a bond equivalent yield basis.
Foru ard rates were calculated for each quotation date to match up with each available Tieasurv bill futures contract. Thus if a futures eontm act were to be delivered in 30 days, at which time the delivered I reasury bills w ould have 90 days to maturity a forward rate was calculated using the yields on an out standing Treasury bill maturing in 30 days and an outstanding Ticasury bill maturing in 120 days. If no bills weie outstanding with the exact number of days to matuiity say 1'20, then the yield was estimated by linearly interpolating from the yields on two se curities with matuntics surrounding 120 days -say one with 130 dass and one with 115 days. Ih~result ing forward rate is the implied yield on a loan oi security that begins in 30 days and ha 90 da, s to maturity -the same time frame as the futuies contract."
11 Spo' rates used to calculate forward rat "crc the aserage of the hid arid a ked yield n the pot In ket, For futures contract to he dclii ered n ore thin 01 £ year in the futu, e yields on Treasury coupon securities were used ( inee Treas my bills are not ai.ailable) to calculate the forward rates.
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Once the forward rates matching the available futures contracts were calculated for each quotation date, they were compared to the yields on the futures contracts (futures rates) by taking the absolute difference between the two. For each quotation date, these differences were categorized as being associated with the futures contract nearest-to-delivery (Category 1), next nearest-to-delivery (Category 2), and so on. All the available contracts for each quotation date were categorized in this way. When the market was first formed in 1976, only four contracts were traded, extending out one year into the future, As trading in Treasury bill futures has increased, the number of contracts has been extended. By NI arch 1978, the end of the third sample, there were eight contracts traded, (This introduces a slight measurement error in the ealculaEon of the forward rates since the formulae given below and in the text assume that the spot rates used are for non-cotspon securities,) The formula used to calculate the fonvard rates is that given by Richard Roll, nR, -(n.-91)R~_p 1 n-oiFoi = A comparison of the above formula's estimates of fonvard rates with estimates based on the traditional formula given in the text showed only minor differences. Consequently, the above formula was used for computational ease, extending out two years into the future. Consequently, the number of observations in Categories 4 through 8 are not always equal to 30 for each sample, and the first sample does not have as many categories as the last two samples.
Summary statistics for the futures rates minus the associated forward rates are given in Table I for each category in each sample period. The mean of the absolute value of the differences between the rates are given for each category. as well as the standard deviation and the number of observations. For each category in each sample, the hypothesis that the hitures rate is equal to the associated forward rate was tested by determining whether the mean absolute difference in each category is significantly different from zero. The t-valuc for each test is also given in Table I .
The two futures contracts nearest to delivery (Categories 1 and 2) tended to have the smallest mean absolute differences between the futures and forward rates, while the contracts furthest from delivery tended to have the largest mean absolute differences. All of the mean absolute differences were significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Thus, although the mean absolute differences between the futures and forward rates for the two futures contracts closest to delivery (Categories 1 and 2) were generally less than 20 basis points, the hypothesis that the rates are equal is rejected in each sample. Samples were taken from three different time periods in order to determine whether the differences between the futures and forward rates have narrowed over time. Such an observation svould suggest that in its first year of trading the futures market might have been poorly developed, or "thin," in terms of the number of traders in the market and the availability of information about the market. We could then expect that as the volume of trading in this market increased and information about possible arbitrage opportunities between futures and spot markets was more effectively utilized, the differences between the futures and forward rates would decrease between the first and second samples. and would decrease further between the second and third samples.
Neither casual ohsei-vation of the data in Table I nor statistical tests for significant differences across sample periods support the hypothesis that the differences between futures and forward rates have consistently narrowed over time. Table II presents the results of statistical tests to determine whether the mean ah- 
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Indsea that critic I value of th igniteance t w d I sued u in cochran a pro in, tson to he Belt us-Fisher problem. footnote 1 of t 'Sign l3cantI~difer t on, a o the 1 pe,-e a I el, 'Sigifica Iydfteeatfomz oatth a ercenti eI solute difference in each category of a sample was significantly diffement from the mean absolute difference in the same category in the other two samples.
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The results shown in l'able II do not present a consistent pattern over time.
For example, a comparison of the mean absolute differences between the first and second samples for Categories 1, 2, and 3 indicates that the means are not significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level. Thus, the slight declines in the mean absolute differences for the first three categories nearest to delivery between the first and second samples do not represent statistically significant differences in the relationship of the futures and forsvard rates. On the other hand, the increases in the mean absolute differences between the second and third samples for the first two categories are statistically significant, as is the decrease for the third category.
On the basis of this evidence, we cannot conclude that the differences between the futures and forward rates have been narrowing consistently over time as the futures market for Treasury bills has become more developed. Other explanations for the statistically sig- tra'_r-n~ipurtnnitis-slit ii acli'r~. lit tillS easy tradiig lJnt intl lulu irs n'ar'l'et,s u iY nut Tires'',',tril\ result in s'i~iIalLIlglIItllj't'~lush lur~~'as'clrates.
Given that there are significant differences between futures and forward rates that have not declined over time, the question arises as to whether or not these differences are systematic. If the differences are systematic, can we identify some factor or factors that would cause such systematic differences? A further issue is to re-examine the argument that market traders will arbitrage away differences between futures and forward rates. This argument xvas based on the assumption that a futures contract is essentially identical to an implied forward contract. If a futures contract is substantially different from an implied forward contract, then market traders will not necessarily drive futures rates to equality with forward rates. However, even if a futures contract is essentially identical to an implied forward contract, the existence of transactions costs in trading spot and Page 26
To examine whether there are systematic differences between futures and forward rates, the mean arithmetic difference for each category in each sample period is given in Table III . The arithmetic differences are systematically negative in all periods for Category 1, zero or negative for Category 2, and systematically positive in all periods for Categories 3 through 8. With the exception of Category 2 in Periods I and II, all of the arithmetic differences are significantly different from zero. Thus, futures rates for contracts closest to delivery are generally lower than their associated forward rates, while futures rates for later-dated contracts are generally higher than their associated forward rates. Explanations of the spread between futures and forward rates must be able to account for both the spread itself and its change in sign as the delivery date is extended into the future.
In a recent article, William Poole hypothesizes that futures and forward rates should not be equal because of the effect of transactions costs on these yields. 1 ' He argues that transactions costs are basically zero for futures contracts but positive for trades in the spot market, Other factors affecting futures and forward rates (such as term or liquidity premia and interest rate expectations) are assumed to be about the same, while the effect of transactions costs would tend to increase forward rates. Consequently, Poole concludes that futures rates should be lower than forward rates.' 4
Poole obtains empirical support for his hypothesis by examining the futures contract closest to delivery (our Category 1). He finds that the mean (arithmetic) difference between futures and forward rates is indeed negative, indicating that futures rates are lower than forward rates. The mean difference also tends to be significantly different from zero; a result consistent with that reported in our Table III. In Poole's subsequent discussion of the policy implications of the Treasury bill futures market, he assumes that his findings apply to all futures maturities (i.e., all categories in Table III) , not just to the contract closest to delivery," This assumption is not supported by our data. The results shown in Table III indicate that Poole's hypothesis holds only for Categories 1 and 2 (the two contracts closest to delivery). For the other contracts that are delivered further in the future, the futures rates are higher than the forward rates contrary to Poole's hypothesis.
Poole seems to argue that futures rates are close to being equivalent to the market's expectations of future interest rates.
Quotes on the nearest maturity in the bill futures market can, therefore, be interpreted for all practical purposes as the market's unbiased estimates of the future spot rates on 13-week bills.'°I f the findings in the previous section apply to all future maturities, then the differences between the futures rates and the realized spot rates over the last two years reflect genuine expectational errors rather than term premiums attached to the futures ratesj'~P The evidence presented here indicates that it is misleading to extrapolate from the evidence on the futures contract closest-to-delivery to the later-dated contracts. Futures rates on the later-dated contracts are generally 50 to 100 basis points higher than their associated forward rates, which suggests the existence of some substantial differences between the factors affecting the futures and forward rates.
The relatively large and statistically significant differences in Table III between the futures and forward rates for the later-dated futures contracts raises the issue of whether substantial arbitrage opportunities exist for these contracts. Poole investigated this issue for the contract closest to delivery and found that few arbitrage opportunities exist.
Poole defined upper and lower critical points for profitable arbitrage for the futures rate given the spot yields, taking into account transactions costs. Values of the futures rates that lie between these upper and lower critical points indicate that profitable arbitrage opportunities do not exist. Poole calculated upper and lower arbitrage points using daily data between January 6, 1976 and June 23, 1977 for the contract closest to delivery. He found that profitable arbitrage opportunities rarely existed, and were small in magnitude when they did exist.
By converting Poole's formulae for the upper and lower arbitrage points to a bond equivalent yield basis (from his discount yield basis), we applied his approach to our three samples of data. In doing so, the formulae are not exact since the transactions costs associated with arbitragiug the futures contracts further from delivery are larger than for the contracts closest to delivery. This is because maturities for securities in the spot market do not exactly match up with the matnrities associated with the futures contract. In addition, for futures contracts to be delivered more than one year out,~'ields on Treasury coupon sccunties were used to calculate forward rates (see footnote 11), Consequently, transactions costs associated with arhitraging the later-dated contracts would be higher than the ones used in Poole's formulae. This means that our adoption of Poole's formulae understates the upper arbitrage point, and overstates the lower arbitrage point. The spread between the upper and lower points is therefore understated, so that there may appear to he arbitrage opportunities which would not in fact be profitable if we took all the transactions costs into account.
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Nevertheless, the application of Poole's formulae will at least indicate the extent of arbitrage opportunities using a conservative estimate of the transactions costs involved. For each category of contract in each sample period, Table IV shows the number of futures rates that are above the upper arbitrage point, below the lower arbitrage point, or within the upper and lower points. Table IV also shows the number of futures rates that are within or "close" to (defined as within .10 of) the upper or lower arbitrage points.
Aggregating over all three sample periods, the results for Categories 1 and 2 tend to support Poole's findings. Over 75 percent of the futures rates in Categories 1 and 2 are within, or "close" to, the upper and lower arbitrage points, taking all three periods as a whole. However, the percentage for Period III alone is considerably lower than for Periods I and II. Furthermore, the percentage tends to decline as the delivery date extends further into the future. For categories 6, 7, and S over all three sample periods, the number of futures rates within, or "close" to, the upper and lower arbitrage points are only 45, 36, and 5 percent, respectively. Of course, the calculation of the arbitrage points for these First, when the futures rate falls outside the upper and lower arbitrage points for the two contracts closest to delivery (Categories 1 and 2), it is almost always below the lower arbitrage point. Futures rates for later-dated contracts-, on the other hand, are almost always above the upper arbitrage point when they fall outside the upper and lower hounds. Second, when the futures rate is above the upper arbitrage point for the later-dated contracts, the difference between the futures rate and the upper bound ranges from less than 10 basis points to over 100 basis points (one full percentage point), and generally averages over 30 basis points in each category. Thus, unless the later-dated contracts are most likely to be subject to calculations of the upper arbitrage points for the latererror since they are based on yields on Treasury coudated contracts are substantially tmderestimated. it pon securities rather than Treasury bills, and since the appears that systematic arbitrage opportunities frespot maturities of the securities used do not match quently existed for the later-dated futures contracts up exactly with the later-dated futures contracts. during our sample periods.12 Nevertheless, there are still some puzzling features about the results.
If profitable arbitrage opportunities exist but are not acted upon by market traders, then we should not expect futures and forward rates to be as closely related as we had earlier suggested, and we certainly should not expect them to be equalized. Such a situation could explain file results obtained earlier, that futures rates and forward rates are not equal. However, such a situation implies that there is a market inefficiency or failure present. Such inefficiency or failure could be due to lack of information about trading opportunities or to institutional constraints on trading. Since information about trading in futures markets is likely to improve over time, and since institutional constraints encourage innovations that reduce their effectiveness, such a situation of market inefficiency or failure will probably he reduced over time.
If transactions costs are substantially larger than those used here, it may be that profitable arbitrage opportunities rarely existed despite the large spreads between the futures and forward rates for the laterdated contracts. In this case, we again should not expect futures and forward rates to be as closely related as was earlier suggested. Given transactions costs, futures rates and forward rates may not be equalized.
However, Poole's argument based on transactions costs led him to conclude that futures rates should be lower than forward rates. Even though transactions costs might explain why futures rates and forward rates are not equalized, it is still puzzling that futures rates are substantially higher than their associated forward rates for the later-dated contracts, contrary to Poole's argument. This suggests that factors other than transactions costs may affect futures rates differently than forward rates, and we now turn to a consideration of these other factors.
Poole implicitly assumes that factors other than transactions costs have the same effects on both futures and forward rates. Thus, since transactions costs are expected to increase forward rates, and since transactions costs are close to zero for futures contracts, Poole concludes that futures rates will be less than their associated forward rates.'°That this conclusion is not supported by evidence for the laterdated futures contracts suggests that there are other factors embodied in futures and forward rates that have effects in the opposite direction to the transactions-cost effect discussed by Poole. Furthermore, this effect is stronger for the later-dated futures contracts than for those close to delivery.
Both futures rates and forward rates can be broken down into expectational and premium components. Since one-period expectations of future interest rates should be the same in both rates, we must consider the premium components of these rates. The premium lOPoole, "Using T-BiIl Futures to Gauge Interest-Rate Expectations," p. 14.
associated with a fonvard or futures rate is generally considered to be a liquidity premium associated with interest-rate risk, or a term premium associated with investors' maturity preferences.
For a liquidity premium embodied in a futures rate to be different from the liquidity premium embodied in a comparable forward rate implies that the interestrate risk associated with the futures contract is different than that associated with the comparable implied forward contract. For futures rates to be higher than forward rates for the later-dated contracts as a result of differences in liquidity premia, a given rise in interest rates \vould have to generate a larger risk of capital loss in the futures contract than in the implied forward contract, It is not obvious why this would be the case.
For a term premium embodied in a futures rate to be different from the term premium embodied in a comparable for\vard rate implies that investors' maturity preferences vary both across maturities and across financial instruments. It is again not obvious why this would be the case.
One factor that has been ignored in the discussion of futures contracts is default risk. Treasury bills traded in the spot market are considered to be default free. Hence, implied forward rates would not embody premia related to default risk. However, a futures contract is not guaranteed by the U.S. Government, but is rather guaranteed by the exchange on which it is traded, Although the futures contract involves delivery of Treasury bills that are default free, the contract itself is not default free. Consequently, the futures rate may contain a risk premium associated with default risk.
This default risk factor would be more important for the futures contracts that are further from delivery, those for which Poole's hypothesis fails to be supported in our samples. The furthest-dated futures contracts involve delivery of Treasury bills which have not yet been issued; they do not exist. The possibility exists, although it may be small. that there would not be a sufficient amount of 3-month Treasury bills available to meet the deliveries required by the number of open futures contracts held for delivery. Although the Chicago Mercantile Exchange guarantees that a settlement would be made, at least a monetary settlement, the item promised for delivery This risk of default, or risk of non-delivery of the Treasury bills, would tend to make yields on the laterdated futures contracts higher than the yields on the two contracts closest to delivery (where Treasury bills that can be used for delivery have been issued), other things constant. The results shown in Table III are consistent with this hypothesis. However, whether or not the size of the spreads between the futures and forward rates for the later-dated contracts can be accounted for solely by default risk is an open question.
Since yields on futures contracts are the market counterpart of implied forward rates of interest derived from the yield curve, the hypothesis that futures rates and forward rates are identical was tested using data from the Treasury bill futures market and the spot market for Treasury securities. The results indicate that futures rates are significantly different from the associated forward rates. Furthermore, the differences between the two rates have not narrowed consistently over time. Thus, it is difficult to attribute the significant differences between the two rates as being due to the initial "thinness" in the development of the Treasury bill futures market.
Poole's argument that the two rates should not be equal, but that the futures rate should be below the forward rate, was also examined. Poole's results were based on the effect of transactions costs on forward and futures rates, and were supported by evidence using the futures contract closest to delivery. Results from our samples for later-dated futures contracts do not support Poole's hypothesis. Instead, we find that the futures rates are consistently above the forward rates for the later-dated contracts. Thus, Poole's potato futures. Recently a bill was introduced in Congress that would ban all futures trading in potatoes.
results on the contract closest-to-delivery should not be extrapolated to other futures contracts. 21
An explanation which is consistent with the empirical results is that there is a default risk premium that affects and is embodied in the futures rates (since the futures contracts themselves are not obligations of the US. Government) but that does not affect the forward rates. The default risk would be greater for the later-dated contracts, which involve delivery of Treasury hills not yet issued, than for the contract closest to delivery, which Poole investigated. Although further testing and examination is required to fully explore the implications of the evidence given here, the consideration of the default risk of futures contracts should be a useful starting point.
The results of this study imply that we cannot interpret yields on later-dated 3-month Treasury bill futures contracts as the market's unbiased expectations of future spot rates on 3-month Treasury bills. Futures rates do not necessarily reflect the expected level of future interest rates. However, these results do not conflict with the proposition that changes in market expectations of future interest rates can be infen'ed from changes in futures rates.
The examination of interest rate expectations embodied in futures rates is therefore more complicated than Poole's results suggest. Furthermore, if default risk is a significant factor affecting futures rates, then estimates of term or liquidity premia in forward rates will not be comparable to the premia embodied in futures rates. This would make the estimation of the levels of expected future interest rates even more difficult. Consequently, policymakers who want to compare their own interest rate forecasts to the market's expectations should use caution in employing futures rates to measure market expectations.
2t Poole, "Using T-Bill Futures to Gauge Interest-Rate Expectations," p. 15.
